LockTimeNot a policy — an absence of code
A recording of your screen is the most sensitive file on your computer. Encryption at rest, a key that stays in the keychain, and zero network requests until you ask for one.
Anything that watches your screen is a liability unless it is built as one. A privacy policy is a promise about what a program will not do with a capability it has. It is a weaker thing than not having the capability.
Encrypted where it lies
Every screenshot is sealed with AES-GCM before it reaches the disk, under a key generated on your Mac at first run and kept in your keychain. Copy the folder to another machine and you have a directory of noise. The recognised text goes into a SQLite index beside it; searching reads the index and does not open a single image until you ask to see one.
Off until you say so
LockTime records nothing on first launch. You turn it on, and macOS — not LockTime — is what asks you for the screen recording permission. There is no first-run flow that switches it on for you and hopes you meant it.
Password fields are never captured
While any application has a password field focused, macOS raises a flag called Secure Input. LockTime reads that flag and skips the capture entirely; the menu bar icon becomes a padlock for as long as it is up. Nothing is blurred or redacted after the fact, because the screenshot is never taken. Password managers are on the excluded list out of the box, and you can add any application: while it has a window on screen, there is no capture.
Kept only as long as you want
A day, a month, a year, or forever. Expired screenshots and their text are removed, and Delete all history means all of it — images, index and the text drawn out of them.
Zero requests
LockTime makes no network request at all until you choose Check for Updates. No account, no analytics, no crash reporting, no scheduled call home. This is not a switch in Settings you have to find. The code that would do it is not in the app.
Even for assistants
LockTime ships an MCP server, so Claude Code — or anything else that speaks MCP — can search your screen history itself instead of asking you. It opens the library read-only and returns times, applications, window titles and recognised text. Never the images, and it never asks the keychain for the key that would open them. Nothing is exposed until you run the command that installs it, and one command removes it again.